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 Abstract 
Indisputably, the euro has played a pivotal role in the development of Europe. Yet, the euro has 
also been very controversial, raising many discussions related to the nature, role and form of 
the “common currency”. This paper aims at contributing to this ongoing debate from a Marxist 
perspective, presenting the theoretical framework of quasi-world money and examining the 
evolution of the euro as such, from the 1950s when the idea appeared for the first time. In 
particular, the paper focuses on the processes that led to the emergence of the euro as quasi-
world money. These processes comprised a series of political solutions to the contradiction 
between the necessity of all major European countries to impose their money on the European 
market on the one hand, and their incompetence in doing so, on the other.  
The analysis focuses on the post-war European monetary system up until the launch of the 
European Monetary Union. Its object is a historical monetary compromise that passed through 
many phases and managed to survive until the present day. The paper analyses the particular 
mechanisms through which the euro became a reality and points to the class interests that were 
satisfied in each phase. This discussion offers useful insights for the current debate that unfolds 
amidst a deep capitalist crisis internationally and a particular monetary crisis in the European 
Union. 
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1. Introduction 
The euro is indeed very controversial; there is no debate about that. What is debated is 
the historically evolving nature of this controversy. The difficulty starts at the beginning when 
two fundamental issues, namely the origins and the definition, are examined. In the extended 
literature one may find a variety of theoretical positions for both issues, with the mainstream 
view being largely criticized (see the theoretical section and the related lists of further reading). 
Certainly, the debate is influenced by the liveliness of the matter and its importance in 
everyday economic and political life of over half a billion people in more than 45 countries1. 
The capitalist crisis has brought the debate back in the core countries, France and Germany. 
The rise of open or covered fascist parties in these countries brings along arguments of euro 
break-up and return to the national currency2. Euroscepticism and the opposing support of 
further integration unfold in at least three different audiences. The first by order comprises 
SMEs, farmers, self-employed etc., namely social producers with small or medium ownership 
of means of production. The second comprises working people and other poor people without 
access to the means of production. The third is big business, monopolies, Multi-National 
Corporations (MNCs) in all sectors. The argument for all is that, with the one solution or the 
other, they will be better off in what they are doing, while if the other prevails, they will be 
doomed to experience their worst nightmare. This debate flowers amidst anemic growth or 
                                                          
1 Indeed, the euro is legal tender in twenty-one countries (nineteen countries of the Eurozone plus Kosovo and 
Montenegro); it is used officially in another four; fourteen African countries, the CFA franc zone have their 
currencies pegged to the euro; the Danish crone (Denmark and its dependent Greenland) is pegged to the euro 
within a narrow band; and unofficially the euro is widely accepted in a much greater number of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. CFA stood for Colonies françaises d'Afrique ("French colonies of Africa") 
between 1945 and 1958; then for Communauté française d'Afrique ("French Community of Africa") between 
1958 (establishment of the French Fifth Republic) and the formal independence of these African countries at the 
beginning of the 1960s. Since, CFA is taken to mean Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial 
Community), keeping the acronym to remind the dependency of these countries from French monopolies. These 
fourteen countries have a population of 150 mn people. 
2 The National Front in France and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany are the more pronounced parties 
in this respect. 
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stagnation in most Eurozone areas, which translates into high absolute poverty, unemployment, 
skyrocketed competition and difficulties in the reproduction of capital. 
If the question is the efficiency of the euro and its effects on different classes, in general 
but more specifically and interestingly in conditions of crisis, or stagnation; if the consequent 
question is whether an economy can escape the current swamp by staying in the euro or by 
exiting, by contributing to its demise or by applying political pressure towards its completion; 
if the ultimate question is whether all this discussion about the euro, or about money in general 
has any relevance with the exit from the crisis, or is irrelevant altogether; then it is compulsory 
to examine more fundamental questions like what is the euro and how did it emerge. Indeed, 
many authors from different schools of thought and ideological starting points attempt to re-
examine the theory and the history of the euro in order to contribute to the ongoing political 
debate3. The paper aspires to contribute to this quest from a Marxist staring point. 
There are various theoretical and historical difficulties in the emergence of the euro. 
First, the eventuality of common money for a group of European capitalist economies, the 
composition of which was frequently changing, depended upon the discussions between the 
head of states of two countries, France and Germany. It is difficult to counter argue that “[…] 
writing about European monetary integration means writing about French-German relations” 
(Szasz, 1999). Moreover, not only is there unevenness between the participants of this 
unprecedented project, but inside both France and Germany there were forces opposing 
monetary integration. At an extreme extent, monetary integration appears as the obsession of 
few persons, mostly French. The majority of the people on the other hand, even in core 
countries, didn’t participate in any phase of the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty; 
most, if not all, of these negotiations took place behind closed doors. 
                                                          
3 Indicatively, see Bibow (2013), Krugman (2013), Sanchis i Marco (2014), Georgiou (2016) and Schelkle (2017). 
From a Marxist perspective this quest is novel. Lapavitsas (2013) treats the euro as quasi-world money, but doesn’t 
delve into its historical emergence.  
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A theoretical framework for the European Monetary Union must therefore build on a 
theory of money, consolidating a continuously changing number of participating countries, 
unevenness between them and conflicting forces inside them. The mainstream economic theory 
of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and the theories of neo-functionalism and inter-
governmentalism in political science are proven insufficient for such a demanding synthesis.  
Contrariwise, this paper provides a Marxist theoretical framework according to which 
the euro is the solution of the contradiction between the necessity of the French and German 
bourgeoisies4 to acquire a quasi-world money and the limits that they faced. This framework is 
based on the Marxist theory of money and the evolution of the forms of money, the historical 
nature of quasi-world money that will be briefly presented and the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of big business, as expressed through their unions in France, Germany and the 
continent. It aspires to give content to the bras de fer that is eloquently described in most essays 
on the history of European monetary integration. There are two keys for the line of reasoning 
adopted here; the fact that quasi-world money is in all cases a historical product and the 
transformation of the compromise between big business in France and especially in Germany 
from defensive to offensive. 
The paper is structured in two main sections, the theoretical and the historical. The 
former overviews the mainstream theories and focuses on the Marxist approach followed here, 
which is based on the Marxist theory of money enriched by the relating argument of Uneven 
and Combined Development. The historical section examines the origins, the Franco-German 
compromise and the crucial transformation of the latter. The last section summarizes the paper, 
offering insights for current controversies and debates. 
                                                          
4 “A national bourgeoisie seeks to secure a place in the international division of labour and to defend the interests 
of its component parts, including the ability to import, export, borrow and lend” (Lapavitsas, 1999, p. 210). 
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2. Theoretical frameworks for the euro 
2.1 Mainstream theories 
The standard reference point in terms of mainstream economic theory is the OCA 
theory (see related list of further reading).The theory claims that a region, irrespective of 
whether it comprises one or more nation-states, is an Optimum Currency Area if there is full 
labor mobility inside the region, while between the region and the rest of the world there is 
labor immobility. Moreover, the economies that would form a currency union should be open 
and interdependent, while the best candidate countries are these with highly diversified 
production. 
The theory attempts two things, namely to justify theoretically the euro project and to 
provide certain criteria as to who should participate in it. It could be easily argued that it has 
failed in both. Suffice it to say that the countries that were involved as members of the various 
schemes and finally of the Eurozone did not comprise an OCA. Apparently, policy-makers left 
“detailed economic analysis” aside in their negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty (Wyplosz, 
2006a).  
Having done so, they opened the road for an evolution to the OCA, called the 
endogeneity of OCA. In short, the theory does not claim anymore that it predicts if a country 
is eligible for the Eurozone. On the contrary, it proposes a vague evaluation of a country’s 
eligibility once the latter is already a member of the currency union. This evolution marks the 
dead-end of classical OCA, especially when it comes to the expansion of the Eurozone 
eastwards. 
Τhe critique of the OCA here departs from the Marxist theory of money and the theory 
of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD). In short, the OCA is allegedly a currency 
theory, but doesn’t deal with the currency at all. In particular, the form, function, issuer and 
enforcer of this money are issues of outmost importance when it comes to the euro project, but 
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are not accounted for by the OCA. Second, the OCA assumes symmetry and equality in a world 
that is shaped by unevenness. The most striking expression of this weakness is the inability to 
grasp the special role of Germany and France although this role is acknowledged by most 
proponents of the theory and by all historians. Finally, by ignoring the content of competition 
in the monetary field and the interrelation of powers, it fails to see the euro as a historical 
product of compromises that is constantly contested and evolving. 
Political science theories of European integration cannot escape addressing the 
unevenness and the interrelation of powers (see related list of further reading). Neo-
functionalism focuses on transnational elites that aim at practical gains from integration, while 
inter-governmentalism focuses on actions by heads of government, which take into account 
domestic bourgeoisie, exemplary expressed by unions of big business, usually industrialists.  
These theories though do not particularly examine the birth and coming of age of the 
euro, but the European integration in general, and hence, when it comes to concrete analysis, 
they prove irrelevant. Interestingly, a rather heterodox critique of them focuses on the role of 
three unions of big business, namely BDI (Bundesverband der Deutchen Industrie, the peak 
organization of German employers dominated by big industry), MEDEF (Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France, same for France) and ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists). 
This literature is informative for the approach adopted here and will find its place in the next 
section. 
2.2 Quasi-world money and Uneven and Combined 
Development 
The paper’s starting point is the Marxist theory of money as it has been developed (de 
Brunhoff, 1976; Marx, 1981b, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981a; Hilferding, 1981; Arnon, 1984; 
Lapavitsas, 1991, 2000a, 2000b) and recently elaborated in Labrinidis (2014, 2016). In short, 
the evolution of the forms of value leads to the monetary form which, once established, acquires 
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various forms itself. The evolution of capitalism leads to the emergence of the central bank as 
the bank of the banks and the bank of the state that also gathers the national reserves and 
evolves as their trustee (Itoh and Lapavitsas, 1999). The banknote of the central bank emerges 
as the king of the banknotes and is declared as legal tender, becoming thus a new form of 
money that has been termed as “managed money” (Keynes, 1971). This is a process that has 
taken place in all countries where capitalist relations prevail. 
The moneys issued by major capitalist central banks and stamped (and guaranteed) by 
leading capitalist states that manage to break the geographical limits of their domestic 
circulation function as world moneys (Labrinidis, 2014; Palludeto and Abouchedid, 2016). 
They are termed quasi-world moneys and they are structured hierarchically, reflecting at each 
point in time the interrelation of powers between groups of capitalists and major capitalist states 
representing their interests. Quasi-world money is juxtaposed to world money proper, basically 
gold and primarily in the form of bullion. 
The emergence and evolution of quasi-world moneys are complex historical processes 
but it has been shown that, apart from international trade, reserves and the internationalization 
of capital play a relatively well defined and crucial role. The forms, size and holders of reserves 
shaped the formation and reproduction of the current international monetary system and the 
change that has occurred in the 20th c, and especially after the collapse of Bretton-Woods 
played an important role in our story. For the moment, it suffices to note that “with the 
emergence of quasi-world money, reserves have been transformed from a proxy of economic 
power to a burden, from a powerful spear to a heavy shield, from an element of economic 
independence to a process of political dependence” (Labrinidis, 2016, p. 111). Quasi-world 
money issuers hold mostly gold and control the exchange rate through domestic monetary 
policy; they don’t need reserves in the form of quasi-world money since they issue one (ibid). 
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This is by itself a very strong motive for a capitalist country to aim at upgrading its money to 
quasi-world money. 
Lenin (1963), based on Hilferding (1981) and Hobson (1938), formed the classical 
Marxist argument about the export of capital in imperialism5. The evolution of capitalism leads 
to the concentration of masses of (monied) capital seeking a placement (rate of profit, level of 
risk, market share) that might be better abroad compared to the homeland. With a series of 
peripheral countries pulled to the trajectory of global capitalism, the need for exporting capital 
finds profitable getaways. The importance of the export of capital has risen in the capitalist 
world in the course of the 20th century and has enhanced in turn the export of commodities. 
The export of monied capital is simultaneously one of the processes of establishment of quasi-
world money. If African countries start accepting renminbi in the import of capital from China 
(Mukeredzi, 2014; Agence France-Presse, 2015; Chen and Meijer, 2015), then renminbi will 
acquire quasi-world money features.  
Capitalism is a mode of production that creates continuously and spontaneously 
differences in competitiveness and uneven development between corporations. These 
differences, by leading to the redistribution of new value and the loss of part of the surplus 
towards the more competitive corporations, are the basis for the uneven development of sectors, 
peripheries and nation-states. Capital, in its international movement, is assisted by nation-states 
or supra-national quasi-state mechanisms or institutions. The state performs a series of 
functions in the economic, political and ideological level that underpin the recreation of 
capitalist relations in the long run (Harvey, 1999, 2006; Vlachou and Christou, 1999; Vlachou, 
2009). Indeed, “today the process of uneven development presents itself in more vivid detail at 
all spatial scales than in any previous period” (Smith, 2008). Contributions to the theory of 
                                                          
5 Lapavitsas (2013) provides a critical account of the argument, while Ivanova (2013) relates the function of the 
US dollar as quasi-world money with the export of capital. 
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UCD, apart from Lenin's (1963) seminal formulation, can be found in Desai (2013), Harvey 
(2003) and Smith (2008). 
Serfati (2016, p. 256) observes that “[d]ominant states and their dominant capitals 
shaped the EU institutional set-up and did so in a quite unique historical context: the collapse 
of and/or revolutionary challenge to the state apparatus in most European countries after WWII, 
the need to unify European governments to protect the ‘free world’ against the westward 
penetration of Soviet forces, and US support for the reconstruction of capitalist countries 
through massive accumulation as a mean to buttress their domination”. Moreover, he argues 
that “underlying the current era of the world extension of capitalist domination, there exists a 
hierarchy of countries and a very asymmetrical configuration of inter-state relationships” (p. 
258). Additionally, Hudson (2003, p. 30) concludes that, in the EU, “[t]he legacies of past 
uneven development, allied to the effects of intensified market competition as companies seek 
to exploit differences between places, have led to new forms of uneven development”. 
The above approach is compatible with the political science literature that stands 
critically towards neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism, focusing on the role of 
corporations, mainly in France, Germany and in other countries in the set-up of the Eurozone 
(Cowles, 1995; Pistor, 2001; Apeldoorn, 2002; Georgiou, 2014, 2016). These authors examine 
closely BDI, MEDEF and ERT as collective bodies of dominant capitals in Germany, France 
and the other EEC countries. It can safely be argued that these organizations reflect the interests 
of the bourgeoisies in the corresponding countries. 
To recap, the euro must be treated as a quasi-world money, namely credit money that 
can exit the borders of the Eurozone enforcing the export of capital for big corporations and 
strengthening their position in the competition in the world market, especially against US based 
corporations; furthermore, eliminating the necessity of reserves and minimizing the scope of 
exchange rate policy, deliberating hence idle money for capitalists in the Eurozone and 
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providing the corresponding banking systems and the monetary authorities with many degrees 
of freedom. 
Its uniqueness lies on the fact that it is not the managed money of a certain leading 
capitalist country that exited the borders, but the product of a compromise between leading 
capitalist countries, and the dominant corporations domiciled there. The euro was introduced 
simultaneously in the interior of the Eurozone as managed money and in the rest of the world 
as quasi-world money. As such a compromise it contained and reflected the hierarchically 
structured power of the member states and their dominant capitals. The monetary integration 
process in general was always subject to the particular historical solution that was given – each 
time and for each participant – to the contradiction between the necessity for quasi-world 
money and the inability to have it. 
3. The story of a peculiar Quasi-World Money 
In this section, the historical events related to the European monetary integration will 
not be reproduced, given the space limits, but instead they will be used in a meaningful sense 
from the perspective of this paper. The reader is strongly encouraged to use the related list of 
further reading, especially for events that she is not familiar with. The section focuses on the 
origins of the process, the principal agents and the nature of the force that brought and kept 
them together and the crucial turning points. 
3.1 Origins 
Euro banknotes entered into circulation in 2002, while the euro was introduced in the 
beginning of 1999, seven months after the official launch of the ECB. Yet, the euro only 
replaced the European Currency Unit (ECU), which in turn was the successor of the European 
Unit of Account (EUA). The EUA, gold in content, is usually acknowledged for its use in the 
1970s, but its tracks lead us back to the initial Intra-European Payments Schemes (IEPS) of the 
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immediate post-war years and the more well-known European Payments Union (EPU, 
est.1950) and European Monetary Agreement (est.1955).  
The ECB is the successor of the European Monetary Institute (EMI, est.1994) which 
had previously replaced the European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF, est.1973). 
Although, the first reference of such an institution is the European Reserve Fund (ERF, 
proposed 1958), the actual predecessor of EMI/ECB was the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) along with the Monetary Committee (est.1958) and the Committee of Governors of 
Central Banks (CoG, est.1964). 
In the first evaluations of the European Monetary Integration, the “humble beginnings” 
were located in the immediate post-war years. “Such a process really began after the Second 
World War with a series of formal intra-European schemes designed to facilitate multilateral 
trade and payments.” (Coffey and Presley, 1971, p. 3). The times were harsh and it seems that 
capitalists were facing multiple and inseparable problems of economic, social, ideological and 
military nature; against each other, their people and the peoples that were attempting to build 
(or rebuild) socialism.  The section focuses on the monetary problem. 
The immediate difficulty was that all capitalists apart from the North Americans 
desperately needed world money, while the North Americans needed desperately buyers 
holding world money for their commodities6. This was addressed by the Bretton Woods 
arrangements and the export of dollars through the Marshall Plan and the US military expenses 
in Germany and elsewhere. Yet, both solutions were extraordinary, one-off, one-sided, 
                                                          
6 “European trade and productive capacity emerged as the most wounded and defeated element in the war, 
industrial production being less than 75 per cent of its pre-war level in France, Germany and the Netherlands; 
there had been a failure to replace or repair capital equipment, and inventories of raw materials and consumer 
durables had been sadly depleted. Trade was in an equally dismal position. […] Unlike most European countries, 
the United States had been able to expand its productive capacity throughout the war, increasing its Gross National 
Product by more than half, so that in 1945 it produced the major portion of the world's manufactures. Europe, 
unable to produce for itself, imported such necessities from the United States in an attempt to reconstruct and 
develop its industries.” (Coffey and Presley, 1971) 
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abnormal, shortsighted and, as such, without future. They didn’t address imbalances of all sorts, 
convertibility problems and unevenness. 
Access to world money was particularly difficult for continental European capitalists. 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium were deprived both of gold and of quasi-
world money, unlike the UK that had retained its gold reserves, had access to new gold 
production in South Africa and issued a quasi-world money accepted in the Commonwealth, if 
nowhere else. On the other hand, the UK was having difficulties in retaining the previous status 
of the pound, and even its convertibility, especially given her meager, for these matters, gold 
reserves7 (Labrinidis, 2016). 
Both the dollar supply through the Marshall Plan and the general shortage of world 
money brought European capitalists closer to each other. The former led to the establishment 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, est.1948) for the 
administration of the Marshall funds; the latter to the promotion of intra-European trade and 
finally the establishment of the EPU. The union was supported financially by the US and 
institutionally by the BIS. It was very successful in reducing the volume of payments and 
therefore promoted the liberalization of payments. The result was that, by 1953, multilateralism 
was almost fully restored for the participating European countries (Yeager, 1976; Bordo, 1993; 
Eichengreen and Macedo, 2001). 
3.2 The Franco-German alliance: antagonism and 
compromise 
In the first post-war decade the capitalist world market was in a mess. The problem was 
certainly not monetary. On the contrary, the monetary arrangements reflected the interrelation 
of powers in the economic, military and political arena. Continued retreat behind national 
                                                          
7 In 1948, the US was holding more than half of world’s official international reserves, while the UK a mere 5 
percent. The reserves of the other continental European countries were negligible, with the exception of 
Switzerland (Labrinidis, 2016). 
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borders was in opposition to the strong ideological frontier against the USSR. In other words, 
the supposedly solid capitalist camp was fragmented. This contradiction was exemplarily 
reflected in the case of West Germany, which in theory should have been rearmed against the 
communist enemy exemplified by the USSR, but the “allies” did not trust her, for fear of the 
German bourgeoisie reusing the arms against them. The “allies” – the US, France and UK – 
helped West Germany with all the possible ways, while keeping this country under occupation 
up until the mid-1950s. The US imposed a form of three-layer federal state, which was by 
construction very weak, with a strong central bank while retaining a significant military 
presence. This arrangement satisfied the French position against German expansion. West 
Germany, although with restricted sovereignty8 and very low political power inside the 
capitalist camp, based on the old economic structure of monopolies, the very strong 
infrastructures and the skilled and oppressed labour, recovered economically very quickly and 
by the mid-1950s it had showed signs of great dynamism; any alliance that would provide her 
with sovereignty would do. 
At this time, the Suez crisis (1956) played a catalytic role – it seemed to have tipped 
the scales in favor of France allying with West Germany; and the UK with the US. “The 
political framework underpinning EMU depended on two states of more or less equivalent 
economic weight, France and Germany, reaching a balanced deal” (Bordo and James, 2006)9. 
“The issue of monetary integration was therefore to a large extent a power struggle between 
France, supported by most EEC countries and by the European Commission, and Germany, 
supported by the Netherlands” (Szasz, 1999). Indisputably, the monetary integration process 
was always a Franco-German debate and both the initiatives and the decisions were the result 
of compromises in the frames of this debate. 
                                                          
8 In West Germany, the first post-war elections were held 4 years after the end of the war, in August 1949. Formal 
sovereignty was achieved in 1955 (Leaman, 1988, p. 82). 
9 “Balanced deal” is a descent term for “compromise”. 
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Nevertheless, in both countries, there were organized economic interests that were for 
and against monetary integration alternating and co-existing in the course of time. Beginning 
with France, “there was considerable opposition […] against establishing a common market in 
which French industry would be exposed to German competition” (Szasz, 1999, p. 4). This 
ambiguous stance of France was the result of an attempt to preserve and maximize national 
control over monetary and macroeconomic policymaking in an increasingly integrated world 
economy, by repelling the American and German monetary policies upon the franc and the 
French economy, while addressing the failure to achieve a monetary compromise at the 
international level (Howarth, 2001). It is certain that the opposing parties, nationalists and pro-
Europeanists, were reflecting the interests of different fractions or groups of capitalists at 
various instances, depending also on the strength of the labour movement in the country and 
the necessary consents. Howarth (2001) argues that the French motives were monetary and 
economic power at the international and European levels, and domestic political 
considerations. This multilayered and complex policy involved the control of inflation; the 
reform of the domestic economy, including the banking system, the independence of the 
Central Bank and the lowering of interest rates; the strengthening of French agriculture through 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)10; the shielding of the Franc against speculation and 
the protection of the reserves of the Banque de France; the aim for a surplus in the country's 
international payments position; and domestic political objectives that relate to the smoother 
satisfaction of the interests of the bourgeoisie along with the promotion of parties and 
personalities.  
On the other side of the Rhine, things seem more straightforward although equally 
contradictory. In Germany, the debate was always between the government and the 
                                                          
10 Crawford (1996), among others, stresses the importance of CAP for monetary integration. Farm price supports 
and CAP are central to the EEC from the outset (Kenen, 1969; Baltas, 2001) 
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Bundesbank. The weakness of the former accrues directly from the particular three-layer 
federal structure imposed that precludes the emergence of a politically and fiscally strong 
center. The strength of the central bank, the so-called second government, accrues from its 
independence from the government and reflects the economic power of the German 
monopolies. The excellent economic performance of the German big corporations contradicts 
the bounded political sovereignty, the practically confiscated gold reserves and the restrictions 
over military forces. 
The pursuits of the Bundesbank and the German Chancellor were clear and consistent, 
although often reflecting the above contradiction. They both opted for Lebensraum11 with 
other, non-military, means. Before the war, West Germany was heavily dependent upon the 
East, including the area that formed the DDR, in agricultural products, raw materials and buyers 
for her export industry. CAP relieved this dependence only partially. The Bundesbank thus 
insisted on more capital liberalization and open markets since it represented very competitive, 
export-oriented corporations. 
The government, on the other hand, initiated the Ostpolitik in the late 1960s. This was 
a policy that allowed German monopolies to make good deals with socialist countries, 
including East Germany and the USSR. At the same time, it managed to keep the DM 
undervalued, strengthening thus the export-led firms. Third, it gained economic space in order 
to address the economic crisis of the late 1960s with fiscal expansion. For these pursuits, the 
government had to consent to French pressures for more monetary integration. 
At the same time, both France and Germany were trying to defend their capitalists from 
the penetrating power of the North American quasi-world money. The Bretton-Woods 
                                                          
11 The Lebensraum (living space) argument of the political representatives of the German bourgeoisie comes from 
the end of the 19th century although it became widely known through Hitler’s implementation. It expresses the 
constraints of German imperialism, namely the lack of colonies; insufficient access to the sea; lack of control over 
gold mines, basic raw material sources like oil fields, and trade routes; exclusion from markets and inability to 
exclude others from any market other than the German. See also Schlupp (1992) 
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agreement was tottering, especially because of the capital controls and the necessity of the 
capital to break them. The emergence of the Eurodollar market, the establishment and the 
breakdown of the London Gold Pool (March 1968) were omens of the upcoming official 
collapse of Bretton Woods. These events led to the acceleration of accumulating dollar reserves 
to unprecedented, for the era, levels12.  
In France, the nationalist Général was replaced by pro-Europeanist Pompidou. The OCA 
theory had just provided a theoretical framework for monetary integration. The Werner report 
and the Barre Plan (1968-69) set in motion a roadmap for the establishment of the euro which 
was sealed in the summit of The Hague. The fact that the much afraid collapse of Bretton-
Woods actually came about just afterwards and did not allow the project to materialize does 
not reduce the importance of the compromise achieved, nor does it eliminate the forces that led 
to this compromise. 
3.3 The Compromise transforms: from defensive to 
offensive  
The history of the three decades between the Werner report and the actual introduction 
of the euro is the history of the fact that the French and the German capitalists did not manage 
to have the desired quasi-world money of their own, in order to compete against the extra power 
provided to the Americans by the dollar. This history was embellished by several episodes, not 
always directly related to this contradiction or to the clash of the intra-European (i.e. Franco-
German) interests. Although the Franco-German channel was always open, especially after the 
formation of the Monetary Committee and the CoG, and there was a continuum in the 
                                                          
12 The German and Japanese governments explained the accumulation of dollar reserves as a price their countries 
needed to pay for the security provided by the US. Indeed, the Bundesbank president, Karl Blessing, in March 
1967 signed the so-called Blessing letter, in which he committed the Bundesbank not to exchange its surplus 
dollars for gold in an explicit recognition that this was the price that Germany needed to pay for the maintenance 
of the US military presence in Germany (Bordo and James, 2006). 
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negotiations up to the present day, there were several crucial historical moments since the 
origins discussed above. 
After the collapse of international monetary system in the beginning of the 1970s and 
amidst a capitalist crisis throughout the 1970s, the roadmap for the euro froze, but special 
monetary arrangements, known as “the Snake”, seemed initially to keep European countries 
close to each other. Nevertheless, France and the UK had to withdraw from the “Snake” and 
the latter became a system linking various small countries’ currencies to the mark and in this 
way the mark was put in the heart of the continental European monetary system since 197613.  
In spring 1978 Germany was facing difficulties over the dollar–mark exchange rate, the 
initial problem being speculative flows between the USD and the DM. It was then perceived 
that the volatility of the DM might be reduced if it was in a zone of stable European exchange 
rates (Crawford, 1996). After the ERM was set, Germany was actually free to pursue 
independent policy in the dollar-mark exchange rate, since the other ERM countries were 
practically assigned to keep the exchange rate of the mark with their moneys within the bands 
(Tew, 1988).  
In the EMS, Germany assumed the strong-currency-country role that had been occupied 
by the US at Bretton Woods (Eichengreen, 1996). There is plenty of evidence that the DM was 
the anchor of the ERM functioning as quasi-world money in the area and alongside with the 
US dollar (McCauley, 1997; Waigel, 2000). Crawford (1996) considers that the other ERM 
countries recognized the advantages from binding to the monetary policy of Germany, and thus 
the mark became the anchor of the ERM and the EMS. Moreover, the EMS led to the 
strengthening of peripheral moneys14. Hence, the imposition of the DM as a quasi-world money 
                                                          
13 “The Snake had been established as a symmetric system in reaction to French objections to the dollar’s 
asymmetric role under Bretton Woods. But once the Snake was freed from the Smithsonian tunnel, the DM 
emerged as the Europe’s reference currency […]” (Eichengreen, 1996). 
14 In the early 1980s, “[t]he Lira was not a world-class currency. With the subsequent hardening of the EMS 
however, foreigners took large long positions in the lira and the other EMS currencies in order to earn higher 
interest rates than those available on deutschemark or dollar assets” (Kenen, 1995, p. 188). 
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in the continent started tempting the German bourgeoisie. Vaubel (1989) essentially proposed 
that, gradually and through the ECU, the DM should become the quasi-world money of Europe. 
Nevertheless, all the steps towards the EMU had a common feature that changed in the 
case of the EMU; they were all defensive reactions to an existing negative situation or prior 
action. Before the collapse of Bretton-Woods, the difficulty lay in the acquisition of the 
necessary means of payment for the world market; after that, it lay in the terms of payment as 
expressed by the exchange rates. The EMU, on the other hand, was an offensive move15. This 
observation makes the period between the Single European Act (1986) and the actual collapse 
of the EMS (1993) decisive for the particular solution of the examined contradictions. The 
reasons for that change are briefly discussed below. 
The French economy underwent a major restructuring that started in the mid-1980s and 
was marked by the banking deregulation. This restructuring would allow the gradual 
withdrawal of capital controls in France, thus enhancing the ability of French capital to exit the 
borders without leaving the national economy, the FF and the reserves of the BdF very 
vulnerable to the flows of capital. Moreover, it would make easier a compromise with the 
German condition for further capital liberalization. In the event of the appearance of 
exceptional opportunities for exporting capital, this liberalization would cease being a 
compromise and would become a strategic choice. 
These opportunities did appear with the overthrown of the USSR and the East-bloc in 
the end of the 1980s. These are events of major importance for our story. For Germany, the 
political weakness in the international scene, the military dependence on the US, the political 
inferiority to France, the big salaries in West Berlin, the impediment to hold its own (huge) 
gold reserves, were all conditioned upon her geopolitical position in the Cold War. With the 
end of the latter, the contradiction between the economic power of German based big 
                                                          
15 Dudler (1984) follows this insightful line of discrimination. 
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corporations and the political power of the bourgeois state of Germany in the international level 
could not be further maintained. 
The opening of a virgin market of such dimensions was unprecedented. Export of 
capital would take place in great intensity and quasi-world money was of great importance. 
Regardless of the relative power of the multinationals willing to pounce, the ones that had 
unlimited access to dollars were better off. The major field of export of capital and the 
necessary for that international reserves was now transferred eastwards; Germany had already 
shifted the locus of investment abroad, also as a consequence of Ostpolitik, and had 
reconsidered the model of “investing domestically, exporting commodities” with a turn to FDI 
from the end of the 1970s that skyrocketed in the 1980s. Export of capital and the necessary 
for that international reserves made Germany compromise her rigid stance against credit 
expansion. The strategy of an undervalued, suitable for export of commodities, DM was 
gradually replaced by the strategy of a strong, suitable for FDI, DM. 
But Germany’s focus was abruptly attracted by the DDR. The access to such a working 
class, infrastructures and raw materials, the expansion of the borders that raised the market by 
25 percent in terms of population and by 43.5 percent in terms of acreage, the reunification of 
Berlin itself, the absolute justification of Ostpolitik; these were such promising eventualities 
for the German bourgeoisie as negative as they were for the rest16. Germany seized the 
opportunity and in few years’ time transformed from the consented force, always dragged by 
the French initiatives, to the real proponent of the euro17. This remarkable turn was sealed by 
                                                          
16 “Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has never forgotten the hostility he faced at a European meeting on 
December 8, 1989. […] Margaret Thatcher famously told the heads of state when they were gathered for dinner: 
‘We beat the Germans twice, and now they're back.’” (Volkery, 2009) 
17 “It suddenly emerged as a very real possibility in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse. France was 
concerned that Germany would divert its attention to the East and Germany formally needed the Allies, including 
France, to agree to its re-unification with East Germany. President Mitterrand linked his support to the 
establishment of a common currency and Chancellor Kohl accepted the deal.” (Wyplosz, 2006b, p. 209) 
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the massive entrance of German monopolies in the ERT from which they previously abstained 
and the corresponding initiatives of BDI. 
On the one hand, the reunification led to a destabilization of the German economy and 
to a destabilizing policy mix that undermined the anchor role of the DM in the EMS and the 
prospects of the DM as quasi-world money. On the other hand, there was worldwide eagerness 
for credit expansion in order to exploit the momentum and invade economically the ex-socialist 
countries, and the EMS countries were no exception. Based on the stability of the exchange 
rates after the Basle-Nyborg Agreement (1987), the EMS countries assumed the power of a 
“hard currency” that they didn’t actually issue and played accordingly with the interest rates. 
The crisis of the ERM in 1992-3, although fully spontaneous, was actually orchestrated (Buiter, 
Corsetti and Pesenti, 1998; Szasz, 1999; James, 2012). 
The commitment of both France and Germany in supporting the EMS was tested in the 
crisis of 1992-3. The heavy intervention of the Bundesbank, the final failure of the EMS and 
yet the advance of the EMU revealed the dedication to the euro, the limits of the Bundesbank 
as a European central bank and the low prospects of the Franc Fort. It also exposed the 
weaknesses of central banks, even of Bundesbank, against freely moving capital that had been 
liberated from the fetters of capital controls. To the degree that the restoration of restrictions to 
the move of capital was not an option, the unification process was one-way for the major 
European countries. The 1992-3 crisis enhanced the conviction that the plan was condemned 
to succeed, since no other outcome was acceptable. 
Since the euro became a strategic choice of the bourgeoisies in Germany and France, 
compromise was achieved on a series of issues that were unresolved for decades. The 
“independence” of the ECB, the price stability as its primary objective and its being located in 
Frankfurt was counterbalanced by the strong role of the national central banks in the actual 
central bank of the euro, the Eurosystem (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004). The strict criteria for 
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membership were loosely interpreted. Economic integration ceased being a precondition for 
monetary union. Factor (i.e. labour) mobility was desirable but not necessary. The major pylon 
of the euro was no other than the compromise between dominant capitals in Germany and 
France18. 
4. Conclusions 
The historical evolution of the European monetary integration process that led to the 
introduction of the euro can hardly fit in the mainstream economic theory. Expression of 
interests of big corporations, especially in trade and export of capital, political considerations, 
unevenness, compromises, are all features that call for a different framework. The mainstream 
political science theories of European integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, 
are very poor when it comes to monetary integration.  
Contrariwise, quasi-world money theory can explain the historical evolution of the euro 
and provide insights for its future. Quasi-world money is a historical product and is based on 
three pilars, one leading capitalist state, its central bank19, and the – united, by definition – 
internal markets. The euro is indisputably a peculiar quasi-world money. Its origins are traced 
to the immediate post war period and the intra-european monetary (payments) agreements for 
demanding trade needs. The “uniqueness of the euro” lies on the fact that it is based on a 
compromise between the bourgeoisies of leading capitalist states, with France and Germany 
playing the tune, and their central banks intervening in all the, united internally, markets that 
comprise a fragmented European market20. The crucial turning point that transformed this 
                                                          
18 “Thus, neither France nor Germany is realising its objectives in EMU as agreed at present. Yet both want to 
proceed, since there is no viable alternative. In doing so each no doubt hopes that once EMU is established its 
own preference will in the end prevail. Germany expects monetary integration will force integration in other 
respects (a 'monetarist' view it once disputed), while France presumably hopes that in a large EMU it will be able 
to muster sufficient support for its views.” (Szasz, 1999) 
19 “A single currency implies a single central bank (with note-issuing powers) […]” (Mundell, 1961, p. 658). 
20 Europe is not homogeneous in terms of language, culture, legal and corporate framework etc. A direct 
consequence of language and cultural differences was expected to be the limitation of labour movement (Vlachou 
and Christou, 1999). 
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compromise from defensive to offensive was considered to be the reunification of Germanys 
in the frames of capital liberalizations and the opening of the virgin market of the ex-socialist 
countries. 
There are three interrelated sources of instability accruing from the above analysis. The 
euro is dependent upon domestic conditions in France and in Germany, the alliance of Franco-
German monopolies and competition with other quasi-world money issuers, primarily the US. 
One thing that came out of this paper is that workers, poor people and producers with only very 
limited access to means of production should follow the activity of MEDEF, BDI and ERT. 
Reference has not been made to big corporations, because they actually comprise and they take 
into account these organizations anyway. For example, MEDEF has posted on the 27th of 
September 2017 a note on its meeting with BDI “to strengthen cooperation and to discuss 
common customs issues”21. In this note, they set the agenda for trade liberalization through 
customs simplification and they close the note by stating that “this work for businesses on 
common matters is a strategic focus of our Franco-German cooperation”. BDI and its “French 
sister association”, as they call MEDEF, have made a common intervention for the EU banking 
structural reform, in order to promote the European Capital Markets Union; to secure European 
(mostly French and German) banks from competition from outside the European Union 
(primarily the US); and to promote a particular separation of banking activities that will not put 
regulatory limits in profitability (22nd of December 2015)22. Finally, in a joint declaration in 
Paris, with their eyes laid on the elections in both countries, in the 17th of March 2017, the two 
organizations reaffirm their strategic choice for the European Union and set 6 fields of action 
                                                          
21 http://www.medef.com/en/news/medef-bdi-meeting-to-strengthen-cooperation-and-to-discuss-common-
customs-issues 
22 https://english.bdi.eu/media/topics/europe/downloads/20151222_Letter_Banking_Structural_Reform_BDI-
MEDEF.pdf 
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for the next governments, comprising the domestic and foreign economic policy that matches 
their common interests23. 
This is the story of the European monetary integration since its beginnings. The current 
capitalist crisis has made this observation trivial and stripped the pretexts of evenness, 
collaboration and equality that were used to clothe the euro. These qualities are referring only 
to the relations between big corporations in France and Germany.  
Moreover, the crisis has strengthened the ever existing Eurosceptics who attempt to 
break the compromise with popular support, assuming that the petty bourgeois interests they 
represent will be better off outside of the euro, or if the euro collapses. In the joint declaration 
mentioned above, BDI and MEDEF try to provide arguments against Euroscepticism, namely 
to shield their strategic compromise. To do so they address all political forces with “the 
following fundamental truths: all citizens have benefited considerably from the single market, 
which allowed for mutual exchanges of goods, services, capital and people, from eastward 
enlargement, through the opening of our borders in the Schengen area, and through economic 
and monetary integration in the euro area.” (Emphasis added).  
Alas, this is only true for a very limited number of citizens of every country. The vast 
majority experiences poverty of all kinds, including working poverty, homelessness, 
unemployment, terrorism in the working places, retreat of working and social rights, closed 
borders, migration, degradation, misery and even difficulties in physical reproduction coming 
from simple and long-forgotten diseases like tuberculosis. Even if it is difficult to prove that 
the Eurozone is responsible for the negative social path described above, it is easily argued that 
it didn’t reverse this course of things. 
It should be clear to the working class in all member states that the future of the euro 
will be determined by the interests of the bourgeoisie in general and of the compromise between 
                                                          
23 http://www.medef.com/uploads/media/node/0001/01/0054d94e14c150f2b8b079de5cb787c050ab9230.pdf 
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the leading parts of the French and German bourgeoisies in particular. When BDI and MEDEF 
refer to “all citizens” in their negotiations, they exclude the working class. For the people, who 
were never actually called to take part to the negotiations, although these affected directly and 
negatively its life and the terms of class struggle in each country, this is a false flag (Lenin, 
1974). People should treat the Euro as a medium of capitalist reproduction, a weapon in the 
hands of their bosses that is firing foreigners and locals alike. The shift from the Euro to the 
Franc, the DM etc, as propagated by Euroscepticists will not change this fact, as people can 
remember from their life before the introduction of the Euro. Instead of Euroscepticism, 
capitalism-scepticism could be far more meaningful, opening new roads to the people in the 
Eurozone, including those in France and Germany. 
5. Further Reading 
5.1 Mainstream theories 
For the uniqueness of the euro see Eichengreen (2008) and James (2012). 
The OCA theory was introduced by Mundell (1961) and developed further by 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) . A much less acknowledged founder with similar though 
arguments is Balassa (1961). Reviews of the theory can be found in Mongelli (2008) and Dellas 
& Tavlas (2009). Direct or indirect critique on the theory can be found in Commission of the 
European Communities (1990), Tavlas (1994, 2009), Backe and Thimann (2004) and Mongelli 
(2008). From the point of view of this paper, the most complete critique is provided by Carchedi 
(2001). Evidence and arguments that the Eurozone is not an OCA can be found in 
(Eichengreen, 1991, 1997, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994, 1997; Crawford, 1996; Bordo and 
James, 2006; Yuceol, 2006; Schelkle, 2013). 
Frankel and Rose (1997) initiated the endogeneity or endogeneities of OCA 
(Yannacopoulos and Demopoulos, 2001; Mongelli and De Grauwe, 2005; Schelkle, 2013); a 
reversal of the OCA. Recently Krugman (2013) attempted an acrobatic revival of the classical 
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theory. The endogeneity of OCA marks the victory of monetarists over economists. This is a 
debate starting in the 1960s according to which the euro should either come as the result of 
economic integration (economists) or spill over and force the latter (monetarists). The 
Bundesbank and the Nederlandsche Bank comprised the economists and were in isolation, 
since the European Commission and most countries were following the French pro-
Europeanists in the monetarists’ camp (no confusion should be made with Friedman’s 
monetarism). The persistence of OCA as a theoretical framework for the euro is parallel to this 
debate. 
The main reference for neofunctionalism can be found in Sandholtz and Zysman, 
(1989) and Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet (2012) while for intergovernmentalism the main 
reference is Moravcsik (1991, 1998). A must-read of the theoretical debates can be found in 
Anderson (2016, chap. 3). 
5.2 Historical events of European monetary integration 
For a general, but intuitive, presentation of the related events see selectively (Coffey 
and Presley, 1971; Tew, 1988; Kindleberger, 1993; Crawford, 1996; Giordano and Persaud, 
1998; Szasz, 1999; James, 2012; Piodi, 2012). Maes (2004) provides an excellent account of 
the events from the Rome Treaties to The Hague summit. Anderson (2016) and Gillingham 
(2016), although examining the EU, are also considered useful sources. 
5.3 Political economy of Germany and France 
An excellent and must-read reference for Germany for the needs of this paper is Leaman 
(1988) and Graf (1992). The equivalent for France is Howarth (2001). For the economic 
relations of two countries see (Deubner, Rehfeld and Schlupp, 1992). 
Germany is the exemplary case of the rise and dominance of finance capital (Lenin, 
1963; Hilferding, 1981) and a clearly bank-based economy (Pistor, 2001; Vitols, 2001, 2004; 
Levine, 2002) with the Bundesbank in the apex. France turned to a special market-based 
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economy starting in the 1980s (Dziobek, Jeanne and Ubide, 1999; Commission bancaire, 2003; 
Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007; Howarth, 2013; Howarth and Varouxakis, 2014). 
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